In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Consciousness and Machines:A Commentary Drawing on Japanese PhilosophyS. D. Noam Cook (bio)Viewed from within the great unity of consciousness, thinking is a wave on the surface of a great intuition.Kitarō NishidaIntroductionRecent developments in AI have made the long-standing debate about what computers can and can't do a major public concern. What we understand the properties of such machines to be, and consequently how we design [End Page 305] and (...) deploy them, will increasingly shape how we live and how we understand ourselves. Thus, there is an urgent need for better understanding of these issues.Susan Schneider, in her book Artificial You: AI and the Future of Your Mind, offers an exceptionally careful and insightful examination of key issues entailed in how we understand AI and ourselves. One of her central concerns is how we might test for machine consciousness. Given the variations in design and function among current and projected AIs, Schneider sees no likely one-size-fits-all test. So, she offers a battery of different tests that she believes together will make such testing more reliable. This seems a wise approach, and reflects the conceptual and pragmatic care Schneider takes throughout the book.Similarly, it seems to me that the question of machine consciousness should also include various understandings of consciousness itself. What consciousness is taken to be has varied widely both historically and culturally. No commonly accepted single understanding has emerged, and may never emerge. Just as having a battery of tests might help us better assess possible machine consciousness, having different understandings of consciousness might give us a better understanding of what we are testing for. The two should work in tandem, each gauging and shaping the other.Like the development of computers themselves, the predominant thinking about AI has been shaped, in part, by key presuppositions of a scientific worldview, with its origins in Western thought and culture. Among these presuppositions are materialism, reductionism, and a primary focus on objective behavior. These are reflected in the common concern with observable behavior of physical aspects of the brain in efforts to understand human consciousness, which in turn has become a familiar model for work on machine consciousness. All this is important and valuable work. But, in the spirit of Schneider's cautions, it should not be taken as one-size-fits-all. Accordingly, I offer one view of consciousness from a different perspective.In what follows, I sketch out an understanding of consciousness that draws on Japanese philosophy, particularly that of the highly influential early twentieth-century Japanese philosopher Kitarō Nishida (1870–1945). I then explore how the tests for machine consciousness that Schneider proposes might be viewed from that perspective.Consciousness: A Perspective from Japanese PhilosophyConsciousness was a central concern for Nishida, whose philosophy is deeply informed by Japanese culture and by Zen theory and practice. As one might expect from such a philosopher, Nishida's exploration of consciousness is not concerned with properties of the brain, but with what we might discern through disciplined reflection on the experience of our own consciousness. Ultimately, he views consciousness as an organic whole [End Page 306] of systemically organized interrelationships of activities and sensations within our subjective experience. This may be understood by first considering 'nothingness'.For Nishida, nothingness does not suggest an ultimate and absolute vacuity, as is often understandably assumed. In Nishida's sense, it is a singular "place" that mirrors the multifaceted world of our common experience. In understanding this, I am told by native Japanese speakers that the English word 'nothingness' has an advantage over the Japanese equivalent, 'mu', in that 'nothingness' can usefully be broken down as 'nothing-ness'. This suggests that nothingness is a state of consciousness where what we commonly experience as distinct (self, other, world, blue, ache, joy, etc.) is indistinct, a state of unified experience. This is consciousness without our finding or discriminating in it the myriad "things" of common experience, but rather a "pure experience" of a singular whole. Nishida introduces his concept of "pure experience" as follows:To experience means to know facts just as they are, to know in accordance with facts by completely relinquishing one... (shrink)

This article begins from the assumption that what was once an integral dimension of progress—the development of literature and of art more generally—now lies outside its scope. The essay falls into three parts that juxtapose French with German intellectual history. The first part examines the notion of literary progress developed by Charles Perrault and Fontenelle, as well as the opposition to it by Boileau and other antiquarians, during the querelle des Anciens et des Modernes in the later seventeenth century. The (...) second part treats the reception of those arguments during the eighteenth century by J. C. Gottsched, J. J. Bodmer, and J. J. Breitinger. Special attention is given to the paradox that Gottsched, the leader of the German antiquarians, and Bodmer, the leader of the German progressives, were equally devoted to the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophical system and thus that German Romanticism, heavily indebted to Bodmer's poetics, had roots in rationalist philosophy. The essay's third part discusses ideas of literary progress in the writings of the early Romantics J. G. Herder and Friedrich Schlegel. As these discussions show, the conception of general progress was formed in a field that has since dissociated itself from progress's march. (shrink)

Along with potential benefits to healthcare delivery, machine learning healthcare applications raise a number of ethical concerns. Ethical evaluations of ML-HCAs will need to structure th...

Einstein, in his “Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper”, gave a physical (operational) meaning to “time” of a remote event in describing “motion” by introducing the concept of “synchronous stationary clocks located at different places”. But with regard to “place” in describing motion, he assumed without analysis the concept of a system of co-ordinates.In the present paper, we propose a way of giving physical (operational) meaning to the concepts of “place” and “co-ordinate system”, and show how the observer can define both the (...) place and time of a remote event. Following Einstein, we consider another system “in uniform motion of translation relatively to the former”. Without assuming “the properties of homogeneity which we attribute to space and time”, we show that the definitions of space and time in the two systems are linearly related. We deduce some novel consequences of our approach regarding faster-than-light observers and particles, “one-way” and “two-way” velocities of light, symmetry, the “group property” of inertial reference frames, length contraction and time dilatation, and the “twin paradox”. Finally, we point out a flaw in Einstein’s argument in the “Electrodynamical Part” of his paper and show that the Lorentz force formula and Einstein’s formula for transformation of field quantities are mutually consistent. We show that for faster-than-light bodies, a simple modification of Planck’s formula for mass suffices. (Except for the reference to Planck’s formula, we restrict ourselves to Physics of 1905.). (shrink)

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have had extraordinary successes in classifying photographic images of objects and are often described as the best models of biological vision. This conclusion is largely based on three sets of findings: (1) DNNs are more accurate than any other model in classifying images taken from various datasets, (2) DNNs do the best job in predicting the pattern of human errors in classifying objects taken from various behavioral datasets, and (3) DNNs do the best job in predicting (...) brain signals in response to images taken from various brain datasets (e.g., single cell responses or fMRI data). However, these behavioral and brain datasets do not test hypotheses regarding what features are contributing to good predictions and we show that the predictions may be mediated by DNNs that share little overlap with biological vision. More problematically, we show that DNNs account for almost no results from psychological research. This contradicts the common claim that DNNs are good, let alone the best, models of human object recognition. We argue that theorists interested in developing biologically plausible models of human vision need to direct their attention to explaining psychological findings. More generally, theorists need to build models that explain the results of experiments that manipulate independent variables designed to test hypotheses rather than compete on making the best predictions. We conclude by briefly summarizing various promising modeling approaches that focus on psychological data. (shrink)

We investigate some non-normal variants of well-studied paraconsistent and paracomplete modal logics that are based on N. Belnap’s and M. Dunn’s four-valued logic. Our basic non-normal modal logics are characterized by a weak extensionality rule, which reflects the four-valued nature of underlying logics. Aside from introducing our basic framework of bi-neighbourhood semantics, we develop a correspondence theory in order to prove completeness results with respect to our neighbourhood semantics for non-normal variants of \, \ and \.

al-Juzʼ al-awwal. al-Taʼsīs al-Qurʼānī al-muʻāṣir li-ʻilm uṣūl al-fiqh al-muqāran, dirāsah istiqrāʼīyah fī al-manjhaj wa-al-athar al-qānūnī -- al-Juzʼ al-thānī. Handasat al-insān al-qānūnī, dirāsah iṭārīyah fī mutatāliyat al-muthul wa-taṭwīʻ al-insān al-muntaẓim -- al-Juzʼ al-thālith. Tiknūlūjyā al-taʻāẓum al-insānī, ruʼyah fikrīyah iṭārīyah fī al-handasah wa-ṣināʻat al-insān al-qānūnī -- al-Juzʼ al-rābiʻ. al-Lā yaqīn al-ẓarfī, dirāsah fī al-masārāt al-falsafīyah al-ʻilmīyah wa-al-qānūnīyah lil-zamakān -- al-Juzʼ al-khāmis. Lughat ṣināʻat al-naṣṣ al-qānūnī, dirāsah fī al-naẓarīyah wa-al-taṭbīq -- al-Juzʼ al-sādis. Ibtikār al-manhaj al-qānūnī bayna al-usus al-ʻilmīyah wa-al-taṣawwurāt al-naẓarīyah wa-al-ʻilmīyah -- al-Juzʼ (...) al-sābiʻ. al-istidlāl al-istiqrāʼī li-qānūn al-mustaqbal fī al-nānū tiknūlūjī -- al-Juzʼ al-thāmin. Naẓarīyāt muʻāṣirah fī ḍawʼ al-manhaj al-Sanhūrī lil-ʻalāqah al-baynīyah lil-qānūn wa-al-sharīʻah -- al-Juzʼ al-tāsiʻ. al-Ḥayāh al-shakhṣīyah wa-al-mawt, naẓarāt qānūnīyah falsafīyah fī al-mafhūm, al-tamyīz, al-miʻyār -- al-Juzʼ al-ʻāshir. Falsafat al-qānūn fī ʻālam al-ḥadāthah wa-mā baʻda al-ḥadāthah. (shrink)

Despite the tremendous promise offered by artificial intelligence (AI) for healthcare in South Africa, existing policy frameworks are inadequate for encouraging innovation in this field. Practical, concrete and solution-driven policy recommendations are needed to encourage the creation and use of AI systems. This article considers five distinct problematic issues which call for policy development: (i) outdated legislation; (ii) data and algorithmic bias; (iii) the impact on the healthcare workforce; (iv) the imposition of liability dilemma; and (v) a lack of innovation (...) and development of AI systems for healthcare in South Africa. The adoption of a national policy framework that addresses these issues directly is imperative to ensure the uptake of AI development and deployment for healthcare in a safe, responsible and regulated manner. (shrink)

The present monograph is devoted to the principal problems of quantum mechanics and is based on the conception first stated in my course on 'Fundamentals of Quantum Mechanics'. The scope and purpose of the above course did not allow some principal questions to be brought out as fully as they deserved, and besides, some important points were only very recently developed to a sufficient extent. This refers especially to the analysis of the action of the measuring instrument, whose dual role (...) as an analyser of a quantum ensemble and as a detector of individual events was insufficiently elucidated. The reader will find that the present monograph is concerned more with theoretical physics than with philosophy. However, I have never separated Weltanschauung from science (and particularly theoretical physics) so that the philosophical implications are also discussed, justi fying publication in the philosophical series. In conclusion, I should like to thank the publisher and the translator, whose initiative and effort have made it possible for the book to reach the English-speaking reader. (shrink)

Study on Hinduism; with a special reference to the world religions and science.

An investigation into some of the literary features of the book of Malachi reveals that each unit is structured in a twofold way. The macrostructure of the book also shows that the book can be divided into two parts. The results of this investigation strengthens the recent trend in the research of Malachi that it is unlikely that the book underwent an extensive redactional process over a period of time and that it is rather more likely that the book was (...) written in a relatively short period of time. (shrink)

Study of Dharma and Āndhramahābhāratamu of Nannaya, 11th century Telugu poet.

A. Raghuramaraju has curated and edited this volume, which proposes a major breakthrough in the field of philosophical studies. The volume reproduces not only Desire and Liberation and Kalidas Bhattacharyya's introduction to it, but also the letters that Bhattacharyya wrote to Chandidas, and Chandidas's own commentary on his text. In Desire and Liberation Vaddera Chandidas creates a new metaphysical system. The author rejects major convergences inphilosophy from both India and the West, especially on the ontological primacy of non-being that results (...) in permanence. He is especially opposed to the idea of permanence, which renders unreliable anything that is not permanent but changing. Chandidas points out that contradictoriness is the structural 'tinge' ofreality. (shrink)